Religious Freedom, Etc.

There’s a lot to respond to in the comments from the last post, so I took the liberty of making this a separate post. You can read about theodemocracy at http://www.bycommonconsent.com/2006/03/theodemocracy/
As for the “marketplace” notion that I introduced, it seems like what you’re asking is how far and to which spheres of life it should be extended. I am personally open to pragmatic considerations. I am not entirely opposed to substance regulation on principle, but I can sympathize with concerns about an overcrowded prison system filled with people who’ve committed non-violent drug offenses. A basic free market system is great, but I can understand how national security concerns of various types might override it (selling sensitive military equipment to a hostile nation and so forth). I’m not entirely certain just how to sort it out, and the (nearly always moderate) public consensus does tend to shift over time.
On the particular issue of religion, I think there should be a “marketplace” in the sense that the state should not have an institutionalized preference for one religion over another (i.e. a state church). But if it so happens that a specific religious viewpoint comes to predominate (or even just gain a significant following), I don’t think there should be an active attempt to reduce its influence in the name of maintaining a secular culture. This would implicitly say that secularism is fact the state religion, and as I said before, I’m against a state religion.
There is a tough issue here, though, with respect to the scope of free exercise of religion. In the case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in 1990, a member of a Native American Church attempted to argue that his being fired on account of peyote use, a practice of his religion, was a violation of his religious liberty. The Supreme Court rejected his claim, Justice Scalia arguing, “to make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' -- permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' -- contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”
Let me quote him at another part at length:

But the "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used [p878] for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.
Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" one large step further. They contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words, that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning.

So I think the critical question for a veil ban (at least as it relates to US jurisprudence) is, would it be directed at the religious practice itself or is there (or could there be) a law against covering one’s face for other reasons? If we do not find just cause in fining people for wearing, say, Halloween masks, I can’t think of a good reason to apply it to burkas, except as a restriction on religious exercise. You might be able to argue it under the rubric of women’s rights, but it seems disputable enough that prudence would come down on the side against a ban.
It is interesting to note that religion has languished the most in the countries of Europe that have established churches. One could argue that it is precisely the fact that religion is freely chosen in the US that has given it its vitality here. As for whether humanity can make the right choices, I think that’s a question that exists whether the humans in charge of the state or the ones acting in the “marketplace” are choosing. The real question is which context is preferable, and there’s good reason to think it’s the latter.
Other people may be more knowledgeable on this than I, but I don’t think religion plays a terribly big role in the neoconservative movement. The religious right and neoconservative foreign policy experts have both played a role in the contemporary conservative political coalition, but they’re generally coming from different places with different concerns. If anything, neoconservatism has played a bigger role in the religious movements than the other way around. Reshaping the Middle East has been an occasion to muse about the fulfillment of end-times prophecies. If there is a connection in the opposition direction, it lies in the Straussian respect for religion that most neocons adhere to ( http://www.reason.com/news/show/34900.html ).